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Abstract 
Based on a national representative survey conducted in 2009, this study 
shows that the decision-making within Farmer Professional Cooperatives 
(FPCs) in China is decentralized to individual farmers. However, there is a 
trend that the decision rights of farming are decomposed to marketing, 
production and input procuring. While the rights for production and input 
procuring stay with family farmers, marketing rights tend to be 
collectivized. Compared to FPCs having external initiating sources, FPCs 
initiated by farmers are more inclined to introduce centralized decision-
making. The governance structure of FPCs in transition China presents 
hybrid forms of both hierarchy and family farming. 
Keywords: Farmer; Cooperatives; Governance, China 
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  11. Introduction 
During the socialism era, millions of small peasant farms in China were replaced by 
large state or collective farms that were subject to central planning, although called 
“cooperatives”. Since the institutional reform in the late 1970s and market 
liberalization in years after, China’s rural economy experienced profound and rapid 
changes. LIN (1992) finds that about half of the 42.2 percent increase in total farm 
output in China between 1978-1984 can be explained by the institutional reform of 
decentralization that activated the household farming system. Individual decision-
making of family farmers reduces the incidence of rural poverty and the figure fell 
from 30.7 percent in 1978 to 14.8 percent in 1984 (NSBC 2007). The decentralized 
decision-making under the family faming system facilitated the agricultural market 
liberalization, and such a market scenario helped to shield upstream farmers from 
rent extraction from the downstream industries (HUANG et al. 2007). To sum up, the 
institutional reform in rural China contributes to the majority of economic progress 
during the early reform period (DE BRAUW, HUANG, and ROZELLE 2004; JOHNSON 
1998; LIN 1992).  
Although the smallholder family farming contributed to the economic growth 
and rural development in the early reform period and facilated the subsequent 
economic reforms, China faces a primary challenge of shrinking farm size, given the 
large rural population. The average size of a farm decreased to 0.54 hectare in 2003 
from 0.73 hectare in 1984 (NSBC 1986-2008). Although there has been a slight rise 
in the average size of each farm due to the emerging land rental and exchange 
between farm households, the average size was till only 0.6 hectares in 2008.  
Small farmers, traders, large scale commercial firms and government agencies 
all face substantial difficulties in accessing information and in working together in 
low cost and low risk agrofood systems (HAZELL et al. 2006; POULTON, DORWARD, 
and KYDD 2005). Small family farmers may find themselves difficult to get 
appropriate and reliable inputs and farming technologies. The mid- & down-stream 
buyers find the transaction in producing and marketing with vast number of small 
farmers too costly. Farm organizations become an institutional option for overcoming 
the transaction costs related to individual smallholder farmers (ROTTGER 2005). 
Motivated by the new market scenario since the 1980s, new farmer cooperative 
organizations emerged in many provinces of China in the late 1980s, and has been 
speeding up since the late 1990s.  
The Chinese government attempts to restructure the agrofood system to a 
modernized one by supporting farmer cooperatives and associations (HAN 2007). On 
October 31st of 2006, the “Law of Farmer Professional Cooperatives” (FPCs) was 
passed in the Standing Committee of the 24th People's congress, and the law was 
promulgated in July 1st of 2007. The law confines cooperatives to providing service 
like purchasing agricultural inputs, marketing, processing, transportation, storage, 
agricultural technology and information. 
1
 It was reported that 2.9 percent of farmers 
and 10 percent of villages were covered by FPCs by 2003 (SHEN et al. 2005).
2
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 Cooperatives’ function in providing finance and other social service are not declared though. 
2
 The statistical figure of village coverage is misleading as there are both formal FPCs that are 
barely functional and FPCs that were not formally registered but provided functional services to 
  2et al. (forthcoming) found 21 percent of China’s village and county seats  had FPCs 
in China and these FPCs provided services to about 24 million farm households in 
2008. Although there are many factors that correlate with the emergence and 
development of FPCs in rural China, the role of government is of primary importance. 
From collective “cooperatives” in the socialism era to family farming and then 
to farmer cooperatives, China seems to take a regressing tour of agrarian institutions. 
However, the recent emergence of farmer cooperatives and associations are far 
different from those in the socialism era. It has a much richer content of 
‘subsidiaries’ in a variety of forms. The subsidiaries might be input providers, 
midstream processors, downstream retailers, brokers, or government forces that are 
embedded with any of them. The producer groups perform different tasks. Some 
jointly organize input and output marketing, and some make joint production and 
centralize the major tasks of farming. Accordingly, the governance structure of these 
emerging FPCs are quite differentiated, from highly centralized ones on the one end 
to fairly loosed ones on the other. 
Historically, agriculture in both Western developed and developing countries is 
neither organized as large hired-labor farms nor as agricultural producer cooperatives. 
Farmer organizations are primarily subject to family governance (SCHMITT 1993: 
155-157). Nevertheless, smallholdings are facing a systematic unfavorable situation 
in technology adoption, climate change, transformed agro-food market toward 
consolidated modern supply chains, and various uncertainties (DORWARD, KYDD and 
POULTON 1998; HAZELL et al. 2006).  
Given the unprecedented situation Chinese farmers face, it is a crucial question 
whether the individual decision-making of small farmers is maintained with family 
farming governance or replaced with collective action of hierarchy. As an 
organizational hybrid, producer organizations are distinctive as the partners take 
jointly a part of decisions in their domain of choice. It is the interest of this study to 
demarcate the joint decisions. The empirical evidence is based on a national 
representative survey on 157 FPCs and the unique dataset provides the most updated 
observation and knowledge on the most recent development of farmer organizations 
in transitional China. 
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 defines governance structure and 
distinguishes the influences on the internal governance of FPCs. Section 3 introduces 
data collection and describes the governance structure of FPCs. In section 4, we 
provide econometric analysis, and demonstrate the determining factors of the 
centralized decision-making within FPCs. Conclusions will be drawn in Section 5. 
2. Conceptual underpinnings 
2.2 Profile of organizational governance 
Farmer cooperatives are considered by MENARD (2004) as one of the hybrids 
adopted in the agrofood system, besides markets at one end and hierarchies at the 
other end. Unlike market coordination in which decision-making is decentralized to 
individual farm and unlike hierarchies in which all the decision-making is centralized, 
farmers in cooperatives jointly make decisions but they mostly rely on decentralized 
                                                                                                                         
farmers. SHEN et al. (2005) decomposed the functional and formal farm associations and therefore 
found 7 percent of villages in China had function of FPCs. 
  3decisions because of the high cost of closely monitoring the numerous partners 
involved in multiple tasks. The choice of governance structure by cooperatives has 
been investigated theoretically by HENDRIKSE (1998) and HENDRIKSE and VEERMAN 
(2001). HENDRIKSE claims that a switch from a cooperative to hierarchies does not 
occur when the industry is reduced. HENDRIKSE and VEERMAN (2001) predicted that 
farmer cooperative is an efficient governance structure when the increasing level of 
asset specificity is compensated for by a sufficient increase in the extent of 
production differentiation. When farmers predict opportunistic behavior of their 
partners, individual decision-making is chosen over join decision-making and a loose 
governance structure emerges in the marketing cooperative. 
Within farmer cooperatives, market governance that features individual 
decision-making is advocated when the degree of asset specificity is low. When asset 
specificity is increasing due to the increasing prominence of the hold-up problem, 
centralized decision-making emerges as in hierarchies. Fig. 1 summarizes these 
concepts. The level of asset specificity k  is on the horizontal axis and the cost of 
governance structure on the vertical axis. The costs of different governance structures 
as a function of the level of asset specificity are depicted.   represents the cost 
of market governance with individual decision-making.    are the governance 
costs of centralized decision-making in hierarchies. X   represents the joint 
decision-making in farmer cooperatives. The figure implies that for projects with 
different level of asset specificity, the cost of governance structure in a farmer 





Fig.  1. Governance structure and asset specificity ( WILLIAMSON 1991) 
2.2 Factors determining governance structure of farmer cooperatives 
A governance structure consists of both decision rights and income rights 
(HANSMANN 1996). Decision rights concern all rights and rules regarding the 
deployment and use of assets. They specify who directs the firm’s activities. Income 
rights delineate incentives. They specify who appropriates the net earnings of the 
firm.  We follow HANSMANN (1996) by distinguishing decision rights and income 
rights of a FPC. The allocation of decision rights can be quite differentiated. At one 
extreme, farmers give up most decisions regarding cropping, marketing and/or 
processing. At the other extreme, all these decisions reside with individual farmers. 
According to WILLIAMSON (1985), four levels of institutional analysis can be 
distinguished. The most general level is Embeddedness, where informal institutions, 
  4customs, traditions, norms, and religion are at the center of analysis. Change occurs 
only once in 100-1000 years. Institutional Environment is concerned with the formal 
rules of the game, like bureaucracy, polity, and the judiciary. Change occurs in 10-
100 years. Governance is about contracting and aligning governance structures with 
transactions. Changes occur in a time framework of 1-10 years. Resource Allocation 
and Employment deals with prices and quantities as well as incentive alignment. 
Changes take place continuously.  
Williamson’s scheme guides our search for the potential determinants of the 
allocation pattern of decision rights of FPCs in China from two levels, that is, the 
economic rationale (level 3) and the political will (level 2).
3
 The economic rationale 
consists of attributes of agricultural products, quality labeling strategy, and spatial 
coverage of membership. These factors distinguish a transaction from others, and 
governance structures are expected to align with them.  
Asset specificity, uncertainty and transaction frequency are three dimensions of 
measuring transaction costs for a certain transaction (WILLIAMSON 2002). Different 
agricultural products may involve different transaction costs caused by their 
biological attributes. For example, although agricultural products in general are 
subject to seasonal factors and are perishable, they differ from each other. Staple 
crops such as wheat and cotton are less perishable and easier to store, compared with 
fresh vegetables and fruits. For the perishable products, farmers making specific 
investment at farm gate are subject to the hold-up problem in negotiating price with 
large processing firms and thus are motivated to form marketing cooperatives 
(HENDRIKSE and VEERMAN 2001). It implies that for more perishable products, 
decision rights regarding marketing are inclined to be shifted from individual farmers 
to a cooperative collective. Certain biological characteristics of agricultural products 
demand high frequency of transaction. For high transaction frequency, market 
coordination is less appropriate since too much transaction costs occur. For example, 
for diary products, farmers need to sell milk every day and thus it is beneficial to 
cooperate in joint marketing. In sum, we expect that the allocation of decision rights 
varies across different agricultural products.  
Quality labeling is adopted in many agricultural chains signaling high quality, 
and both private brands and public certification are well-observed devices for 
assuring quality (RAYNAUD, SAUVEE and VALCESCHINI 2005). Private brand names 
are actually the commitment to ex ante specified high quality standards by a firm. 
The commitment created by brand names is credible because the reputational capital 
of FPCs is at stake under a private brand. Public certification is another option for 
assuring quality. However, under public certification, the credibility of quality label 
relies on government enforcement. For the products with brand names or certification, 
specific investments have been made at the processing and/or marketing stage of 
production.  
FPCs taking the quality labeling strategy, either by registering private brand 
names or by acquiring public certification, tend to centralize decision rights of 
individual farmers, in order to deal with the incidence of moral hazards. The 
empirical research on automobile franchise contracts shows that the variation in the 
allocation pattern of decision rights is driven by potential ex post opportunism by 
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 Social dimension at level 1may also influence the governance of a FPC. However, the analysis 
on such factors is beyond this study.  
  5both dealers and manufacturers, and manufacturers of higher quality cars are 
allocated more control and monitoring rights over dealer’s actions since dealers are 
inclined to damage the contract more in this situation (ARRUNADA, GARICANO and 
VAZQUEZ 2005). Ex post opportunism is also pervasive for both upstream farmers 
and downstream processing firms in agricultural networks, and many decision rights 
by farmers are shifted across the network to the downstream firm dealing with high 
quality products (HU and HENDRIKSE 2009). We expect a similar causal link to exist 
in the governance of FPCs.  
Spatial coverage of membership matters in determining the governance of 
FPCs, from the perspective of membership heterogeneity. Cooperatives help farmer 
members catch the benefit of scale economies, get access to the market, technology 
and capital, and lower risks (SEXTON and ISKOW 1988). However, various aspects of 
the governance of cooperatives, such as collective decision making, are tailored 
towards homogeneous members (HANSMANN 1996). As heterogeneity of member 
increases, the efficiency of cooperatives is jeopardized (LEVAY 1983; COOK 1995; 
CHOI and FEINERMAN 1993; KARANTININIS and ZAGO 2001; HENDRIKSE and BIJMAN 
2002; HENDRIKSE 2006). Membership confined to a local level and producing similar 
products suffers less from the heterogeneity problem. Centralized decision making is 
favored since it is easier to coordinate farmers’ activities and to maintain members’ 
commitment within local communities. 
Political will also play an important role in framing the allocation pattern of 
decision rights of FPCs in China. The governance structures of FPCs are embedded 
in the institutional environment and can not be chosen independent of institutional 
factors. We approach the political determinants by considering the legal framework 
established, political propaganda of new agribusiness mode, and the initiating role 
played by the government.  
Laws facilitate operation of firms. It is a common practice in developed 
countries to enact cooperative laws. Once issuing the cooperative law, cooperatives 
are entitled with legal status. It reduces the uncertainties faced by cooperatives when 
dealing with other firms. Farmers’ may be motivated to join a cooperative and/or 
delegate more decision rights to cooperatives since their ownership status is 
guaranteed by the law. We expect to see more cooperatives as well as an increasing 
incidence of centralized governance of cooperatives under the legal framework.  
It is china-characteristic that the Chinese government may directly influence 
the operation of farmer cooperatives. One factor is that local governments are 
involved in initiating farmer cooperatives and associations. Abuse of authority and 
insufficient institutional supports coexist in agricultural sectors (XU and HUANG 
2009). As a result, farmer members either quit or refuse to delegate decision rights. 
On the contrary, if capable farmers, who are rural elites of wealth, respect and 
knowledge, initiate cooperatives, members have less fear for hold-up. In sum, the 
FPCs with the initiating source by the government tend to leave farmers make most 
decisions while the FPCs initiated by farmers tend to take centralized governance. 
The other factor is that the government actively propagandizes the new agribusiness 
mode such as firm-farmer. Farmer cooperatives are encouraged to take advantage of 
the new agribusiness mode by becoming a production base (sheng-chan-ji-di) for a 
big agribusiness. For the FPCs linked to new business mode, farmers are inclined to 
devolve some rights, particularly marketing.  
  6In sum, both economic rationale and political will determine the governance 
structure of FPCs in China.  
3. Survey Data and Descriptive Analysis 
3.1 Survey, sampling and terms 
The data used in this study are from a national-wide survey in 5 provinces in 
China. The first survey was conducted in the late 2003, collecting primarily 2003 
data in 6 provinces 
4
. Within each province, all counties were sorted in descending 
order of gross value of industrial output per capita, and two from each tercile of listed 
counties were selected from each stratum.
 5
 Finally, 6 counties were selected in each 
province. The same strategy applies to the selection of township in each county; six 
towns were selected and, in each town, we asked all villages sent two representatives 
(typically the village leader and accountant) for a questionnaire-based survey at the 
village level. In total, 2459 villages were surveyed.  
In each village survey, the two village cadres were asked whether any farmer in 
their villages participated in any FPC, including those that were not based in their 
village and outside the boundaries of their village. In the case that the answer was 
“yes”, a set of questions (for example, the legal status, initiation, major functions) 
was presented.  
The second round survey was conducted in 2009 to investigate the development 
status of FPCs in 2008. Considering the increased survey costs related to the FPC 
survey, in the second round survey, we drew a sub-sample from the first one. We 
surveyed 5 provinces and, in each province, the six sampled counties (from the 2003 
survey) were grouped into 3 tercile and we select one in each tercile.
6
 In each county, 
the six sample townships (from the 2003) survey were sorted into two groups (viz. 
poor and nonpoor); we then drew one in each group. Finally, the second round of the 
survey in 2009 covered five provinces, fifteen counties, thirty townships and 380 
villages. The empirical evidence in this study is drawn from the second round survey.  
In the second round survey, we asked the village cadres “Is there any farmer in 
your village currently participating (and historically participated) in any registered or 
non-registered farmer professional cooperatives or associations that may not 
necessarily be in the residential villages”. If the answer was “Yes”, rather than 
                                           
4
 More details about first round survey are available in DENG et al. (forthcoming) and SHEN et al. 
(2005). 
5
 Gross value of industrial output per capita (GVIO/capita) was found as one of the best predictors 
of living standards and development potential (ROZELLE 1996).  
6
 We divide China’s major agricultural production provinces into five groups: the eastern coastal 
areas (Jiangsu, Shandong; Shanhai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong and Hainan); the southwestern 
provinces (Sichuan, Guizhou , Chongqing, Yunnan, Tibet and Guangxi); the Loess Plateau and the 
northwestern provinces (Shaanxi, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Ningxia; Qinghai and Xinjiang); 
the north and central provinces (Hebei, Henan, Beijing, Tianjin, Anhui, Jiangxi, and Hunan); and 
the northeastern provinces (Jilin, Liaoning and Heilongjiang). The first province in italic within 
the parenthesis is selected as a representative province of the group. While we recognize that we 
have deviated from the standard definition of China’s agroecological zones, the realities of survey 
work justified our compromises. Pretests in Guangdong demonstrated that data collection was 
extraordinarily expensive and the attrition rate was high. Our budget did not allow us to add 
another central province (e.g., Hunan or Hubei) to the sample. 
  7surveying the village cadres about the FPCs at the village level (as we did in the first 
round survey), we traced the FPCs and surveyed the FPC heads after identifying 
them in the village survey. A separate questionnaire was used to investigate the 
initiation, the managed products, internal governance structure, the provision of 
inputs and other technical services, the provision of marketing and other services, and 
the personal data of FPC heads. In total, we surveyed 189 FPCs and found 157 of 
them have specific products. In this study, we term FPCs when they have specific 
product(s). 
In the survey for FPC presidents, we asked them how the marketing, farming 
and likely residuals were organized and governed. Marketing is defined as 
centralization when FPCs balance the billing of transactions collectively and 
members pay (or receive) the money with FPCs individually. ‘Bridge marketing’ or 
‘service marketing’ is termed when FPCs provide the information and service to 
members who will bill with input sellers or output buyers directly; FPCs may or may 
not charge fees during the process. When FPCs provide null service of input and 
output marketing, we term them as ‘individualism’.  
Centralized production refers to the governance under which FPCs standardize 
the farming activities and members are required to conform to the production rules. 
Terming this is challenging because the production complexity for different products 
is distinct and it is difficult to compare them. For example, the production stage and 
farming tasks of greenhouse vegetables and dairy farming are totally distinct. As 
such, we asked the FPC presidents how the farming was organized for the major 
farming activities at different production stage. For example, for livestock FPCs, we 
asked mainly the feeding and daily watch. For vegetables, we asked the nursery, 
watering, pruning and planting etc. In the case that one of them was marked as 
“centralized”, we define the FPCs having centralized production. 
Only one third of surveyed FPCs have member equity and 85 percent (46 out of 
54) specified rights of residual claim based on equity. The rest are either FPCs 
having no FPC residual or limiting members’ right to claim the residual. In this study 
we term ‘residual claim rights’ when FPCs had member equity and members can get 
dividend from the residuals. 
3.2 Descriptive analysis 
3.2.1  The emergence of FPCs in China: When and who 
Legal framework. Before 2007, the lack of a clear legal status was one of the 
main constraints to the development of FPCs in China (WORLD BANK 2006). Various 
government departments (such as the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Civil 
Administration, State Administration for Industry and Commerce, Science and 
Technology Association) had all been involved in the administration. The 2007 law 
clearly names the Industrial and Commercial Bureau as the authorized institution for 
registration. The Agricultural Bureaus at the county level (or higher) are responsible 
for supervising FPCs’ operation. As shown in Table 1, 60 percent of the surveyed 
cooperatives and associations – 94 out of 157 – are registered to the Industrial and 
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Commercial Bureau, and 82 percent of them were initiated after 2007. The legal 
framework facilitates the development of FPCs in rural China.
7
 
Table 1  At which agency were the FCOs registered?  
    Initiation Year (%) 
    <=1998  (1998, 2003]  [2004, 2007)  >=2007 
Total 
sample 
Civil Affairs Bureau  0   7   53   40   15 
Industrial and 
Commercial Bureau  1   3   14   82   94 
Rural or Agricultural 
Affairs Office  0   0   0   100   8 
Science Association  14   29   43   14   7 
Others  0   33   0   67   3 
Non-registration  7   10   43   40   30 
Total sample  4  10  37  106  157 
Note: The figures in the table body are percentage in row. 
When. The development of farmer cooperatives and associations in rural China 
has experience four stages since the late 1980s. There were quite a few farmer 
cooperatives before 1998, and there was an accelerated increase during 1999 and 
2003. SHEN et al (2005) found 40 percent of the surveyed farmer associations were 
established during this period. In our study, 9 percent of the FPCs are established 
before 2003 and most of them were initiated during 1999 and 2003.  
A systematic promotion on farmer associations occurred in 2004. We find 24 
percent of FPCs were established during 2004 and 2006. Finally, when the “Law of 
Farmer Professional Cooperatives” was promulgated on July 1
st of 2007, the legal 
framework creates an environment conductive to the development of FPCs. As 
shown in Table 2, 68 percent of the surveyed FPCs were established after the 
introduction of the formal legal framework. The policy support is decisive on the 
growth of FPCs in China (DENG et al. forthcoming). 
 
 
                                           
7
 It is not rare that registration of FPCs to an agency (or more than one agency) is to qualify for 
support from various sources. The national campaign on “Farmers Cooperative Organizations” 
and increased financial support from various government agencies amplify and distort the 
incentive of initiating cooperatives and associations. In the survey, we found a few “empty-shell” 
cooperatives that provide null service to members, but for receiving preferential support from 
government.  Table 2  Initiation and governance of FPCs in China  
   Total   Input Purchase    Marketing 
   Sample pct. 
(%) 








Total sample  157    26 75  56    36 80  41    26  46 
Initiating year                         
  1994-2003 14  9    5  4  5    1  10  3    5  5 
  2004-2006  37  24   2 22  13    6 17  14    2  7 
  2007-now  106  68   19 49  38    29 53  24    19  34 
Initiated by…                          
  Government  44    28   6 13  25    5 22  17    6  8 
  Government+Farmers  57    36   8 33  16    9 36  12    10 14 
  Farmers  33   21    6  19  8    13  11  9    6  13 
  Enterprises  23    15   3 13  7    9 11  3    3  11 
Note: The figures in the table body are incidence of sample. 
 
 
  10 Who. The role of government in the initiation of FPCs is evident. As shown in 
Table 2, 64 percent of the surveyed FPCs had initiating sources related to the 
government – 28 percent from government exclusively and 36 percent from the 
coalition of both government and farmers. The presence of the government in 
initiating FPCs in China was regarded as “too much enthusiasm” and some 
commentators posit that local government officials in rural China view the 
performance of promoting FPCs as the quantitative targets for evaluating their work 
(WORLD BANK, 2006). Nevertheless, in this study, we find the potent promotion from 
the government has been responded to at grass-roots basis; 21 percent of the 
surveyed FPCs reported initiating sources from farmers, some of which were the 
emerging group of specialized farmers. In addition, 15 percent of the surveyed FPCs 
had initiating sources from agricultural enterprises. FPCs become a new mode of 
agribusiness. 
3.2.2  Decision-making and income rights of FPCs in China  
While FPC farmers in China take collective action to form their own 
organizations that assist them in meeting challenges associated with the industrialized 
and commercialized market in agriculture, in fact, the decision-making in FPCs in 
transitional China is highly individualized. The bundle of decision rights consists of 
the rights of procuring inputs, the rights of marketing outputs, and the rights of 
production. Income rights refer to the right of residual claim.  
Production is defined as centralized when a FPC sets up uniform standards and 
requires all the members to conform to them. When looking at the rights of procuring 
inputs and marketing outputs, we observe three modes: centralized marketing, 
service marketing (or bridge marketing), and individual marketing. For centralized 
marketing, FPCs procure inputs or (and) outputs and market them collectively. For 
service marketing, FPCs provide market information to members who ship the inputs 
and products by themselves; FPCs may charge fees from either members or the 
buyers. In this case, FPCs function as a broker. Loosely organized, FCOs with 
individual marketing do not provide any service for marketing inputs as well as 
outputs. Farmers are left to market at the auction price. 
In Table 3 we describe the decision making as well as income rights of FPCs in 
China. Nearly half of the surveyed FPCs function as marketing brokers; 80 (out of 
157) transmitted the marketing information of inputs and outputs to farmers who ship 
the inputs and products by themselves. Although minor, we do observe 17 percent of 
centralized input purchasing via FPCs and 23 percent of centralized output marketing, 
respectively. Almost 16 percent of the surveyed FPCs (i.e., 25 out of 157) centralized 
or standardized the farming process, and they presented very low individualism of 
marketing at the same time. However, centralized production is mirrored with 
centralized marketing. For the 25 FPCs that centralized production, only 8 percent of 
them adopted individual input marketing and 4 percent individualized output 
marketing.  
 
  11Table 3  Governance of FPCs in China  
    Input Purchase    Marketing Outputs 
   
Total 
 Centralized  Bridge Individual    Centralized  Bridge Individual 
Sample 157    26  75  56    36  80  41 
     (17)  (48)  (36)    (23)  (51)  (26) 
Has share  54    15  30  9    27  21  6 
 (34)    (28)  (56)  (17)    (50)  (39)  (11) 
46   15  26  5    26  17  3  Has 
residual 
claim  (30)   (33)  (57)  (11)    (57)  (37)  (7) 
25   8  15  2    13  11  1  Centralized 
production  (16)   (32)  (60)  (8)    (52)  (44)  (4) 
Note: The figures in the parentheses are percentage in row. 
Income rights within FPCs were delineated by equity investment and residual 
claim rights. We find 34 percent of the surveyed FPCs (i.e., 54 out of 157 FPCs) 
required members buy shares, and 29 percent of the FPCs assign the rights of 
residual income to farmers. It reflects the fact that farmers in China do not attach 
much importance to the rights of residual income. What they concern most is 
knowledge as well as access to market channels. The FPCs satisfying such needs is 
sufficient for them, regardless of the delicate design of income rights. However, two 
tendencies are worthy mentioning.  
Firstly, rarely did FPCs in China marketed individually when there was equity 
investment and related members’ right of residual claim. For the 54 FPCs having 
member equity, only 17 percent marketed inputs individually and 11 percent 
marketed outputs individually. FPCs with centralized marketing are organized more 
like a hierarchy with commitment of equity investment. For example, for the 26 
FPCs with centralized input marketing and 36 FPCs with centralized output 
marketing, there are 15 and 27 FPCs that have equity investment respectively, and 
most of them could claim the residual at year end. Secondly, newly initiated FPCs 
are more inclined to require farmers to make equity investments and to hold residual 
claim rights. For example, for 46 FPCs whose farmer members hold residual claim 
rights, 74 percent of them were initiated after 2007 (see table 3).  
In sum, the three different modes regarding marketing activities reflect distinct 
governance structures of FPCs. For individual marketing, there is no statutory 
obligation to market all inputs and outputs through the cooperative. The cooperatives 
are free from the strategic behaviors of members in the case of the contracted prices 
being lower than that in the auction market. For the ‘bridge’ marketing (or service 
marketing), the governance is relatively more loose than that with centralized 
marketing, and the member still hold some rights when deciding whether to abide by 
the rule. The centralized marketing means farmers delegate the decision rights 
regarding marketing out to farmer collectives. 
3.2.3  Initiation status and Governance of FPCs in China   
In Table 2, we decompose the decision-making by the initiating time and the 
initiating sources to investigate the likely correlation. When looking at FPCs with 
centralize decision-making (in column), most of them were initiated after 2007; there 
is a trend of centralized decision-making within FPCs in China. However, when 
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looking at FPCs initiated after 2007 (in row), service marketing and individual 
marketing are still dominating. 
Initiating sources seem to be related with the governance structure of FPCs. 
When FPCs had external initiated sources (namely, government solely and 
enterprises), the incidence of centralized governance is lower than those FPCs having 
initiating sources of farmers. External initiating sources from both government and 
enterprises do not enter the decision making process within FPCs. This is easily 
understood. Although external sources play an important role in initiating FPCs 
(Deng, et al., forthcoming), they could not substitute for member farmers, who have 
the information advantages over any external source. 
3.2.4  Membership and Governance of FPCs in China 
The membership of the surveyed FPCs is by and large within the township 
boundary. As shown in Table 2, 47 percent of the FPCs were within local villages 
and 27 percent were within local townships. Spatial coverage of membership seems 
to be related with the governance structure of FPCs. For example, for the 26 FPCs 
that centralized input purchase, 12 of them had membership only within local 
villages; and the same correlation applies to the decision-making of production.  
When the membership stretches outside local townships, centralized input 
purchase and production seems to be difficult to be maintained. However, centralized 
marketing is inclined to be adopted instead. As shown in Table 2, for the 36 FPCs 
that centralized marketing, 15 of them were outside the local township. The ratio is 
quite low in the centralized decision-making of input purchase and production.  
FPCs in transitional China are not exclusive. Nearly half of the surveyed FPCs 
provided services to ‘client members’ who in some cases differentiate themselves 
from ‘formal members’ only in the registration status and related voting rights (Table 
4). As shown in Table 4, the median size of client members is larger than that of the 
formal ones (or registered members).
8
 While the size of membership presents 
variation (due to initiating sources and products) and may not be comparable, we 
create the variable of the percentage of formal member to the whole serviced 
members. Interestingly, we find that FPCs with centralized farming activities 
provided exclusive services to only formal members. However, this is not a 
determining relationship as FPCs having no client members also engaged in active 




 The size of formal membership may be underestimated. When FPCs update their formal 
membership at the Industrial and Commercial Bureau, they need to collect the full fingerprint of 
all the formal members. Such a work is time consuming and troublesome in rural China. As such, 
FPCs may not update the membership at ICB and the surveyed number may be understated, 
although we asked the enumerators to explain this to the FPC presidents.  Table 4  Membership and governance of  FPCs in China  
   Total  Input Purchase    Marketing 








Total sample  157    26  75  56   36  80  41   26  46 
Spatial coverage                         
Within  village  74  47    12  32  30   10  40  24   18  21 
Other villages within township  43  27    6  19  18    11  19  13    1  9 
Outside  township  40  25    5  27  8  15  21  4   6  16 
Size of membership                         
Formal Members at initiating year 
(Median)  157  23    26  18  30   14  29  15   18  17 
Client member at initiating year 
(Median)  80 35    30  35  43   80  33  35  108  28 
Median Percentage of formal 
member to total (%)  157 88  76 83  100    88 92  83    100  88 
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Although having a wide range of products, FPCs in China are primarily found in 
high-value-added sectors, viz. vegetables and livestock products. Approximately 43 
percent of the surveyed FPCs engaged in livestock sector and 41 percent of the 
sample engaged in horticultural sector, including greenhouse vegetables and orchard 
fruits (Table 5). Interestingly, centralized marketing occurs mostly in the high value 
added sector, for example, livestock and vegetables.  
3.2.6  New Vertical Coordination Mode and Governance of FPCs in China 
The governance of FPCs seems to have minor correlation with the transformed 
agrofood system and the new agribusiness mode in China. Since 2003, the Chinese 
government at every level strongly supports the development of a new agribusiness 
mode called “Firm-Farmers” to reach economies of scale and to strengthen the 
coordination of the agro-food supply chain (WALDRON 2009). The dominant type of 
firm is the so-called “dragon-head-driven’ companies that are expected to channel 
technology to farmers and to stabilize farmers’ access to high-value added markets. 
Although it was found in some studies that contracting introduced vertical 
coordination along the agrofood chain (GUO, JOLLY and ZHU 2007), we in this study 
find very minor effects of such new agribusiness modes on the internal governance of 
FPCs. FPCs function more like a broker and the new agribusiness mode has not 
introduced hierarchy into the agrofood system. 
3.2.7  Quality Labeling Strategy and Governance of FPCs in China 
Although the agrofood system in China is transformed toward modernized and 
industrialized, there is minor penetration at the farm gate via FPCs. Although brand 
and certification are important reputation specificity for FPCs to realize value-adding 
and strengthen the farmers’ ownership along the agrofood chain ( HENDRIKSE and 
BIJMAN 2002), only 17 percent and 18 percent of FPCs had their own brand and 
quality certification (Table 5). For this group of FPCs, very few of them centralized 
input purchase and production. But they tend to centralize the marketing of outputs. 
As we know, marketing itself does not change the quality; the emergence of the 
transformed agrofood system and the new agribusiness mode via FPCs do not enter 
the production stage, and the content of output marketing and production seems to be 
disconnected.  
  15Table 5  Product attributes, quality labeling, new business mode and governance of FPCs in China  
   Total  Input Purchase    Marketing 








Total sample  157  26  75  56   36  80  41   26  46 
Product                         
 Livestock  68 43    9  33  26   15  36  17   5  16 
 Aquatic  12 8    1  5  6   3  4  5   4  6 
 Grain  12 8    0  7  5   3  5  4   4  4 
 Vegetables  46 29    9  25  12   12  21  13   5  14 
 Orchard  fruits  19  12    2  10  7   3  14  2   7  6 
Brand   27  17    3  19  5  14  8  5   4  11 
Certification  28  18    4  19  5  10  11  7   6  8 
Production base  37  24    9  20  8   7  28  2   5  12 
Dragon-head companies  42  27    7  26  9  12  28  2   8  16 
Note: The figures in the table body are incidence of sample. 
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Based on the second round survey, we created a cross-section database with 157 
FPCs. The dependent variables are the incidence of decision rights of input procuring, 
production and output marketing. The explanatory variables are grouped into the 
economic rationale and the political will. The economic rationale consists of 
attributes of agricultural products, quality labeling strategy (brands and/or 
certificates), and spatial coverage of membership. The political will consists of 
initiating year, initiating sources, and externally introduced new agribusiness mode. 
The expected relations have been elaborated in the section 2. We used Logit model to 
determine the decision-making of FPCs in China.  
Attributes of agricultural products significantly affects the allocation of input 
procuring decision, while have no effect on the allocation of marketing decisions as 
well as production rights.  The dummy variable for livestock, aquatic and fresh 
vegetables are positive and significant (at a 1% level of statistical significance). 
(model I). It is interesting to note that the centralized input purchasing more likely to 
occur in high value added sectors where the farming process is highly labor intensive, 
demanding frequent marketing of both inputs and outputs with a wide range of 
varieties. Centralized input procuring places the producer cooperatives in a favorable 
information environment. It is surprising to find that attributes of products have no 
effect on allocation of marketing decisions (model III) since for certain products 
centralized marketing would reduce transaction costs. For example, FOSS (1996) 
pointed out that, in fresh vegetable sectors, the technological scheme of measuring 
and sorting is one way in which transaction costs can be reduced.  
As an important reputation specificity in the modern agrofood supply chain, the 
branding strategy of FPCs in China enhances the centralized output marketing 
(Model III) but it has no effects on the decision making of input purchasing and 
production (Model I and V). FPCs’ certificating their products to certain quality and 
food safety standards, however, affects none of the governance structure of FPCs. 
Public certification is more like an advertising strategy and has no effects on the 
governance of the agrofood supply chain via FPCs.  
Spatial coverage of the membership affects the decision-making of input 
purchasing and output marketing, but in a different direction. When the spatial 
coverage of FPCs is confined within local villages, centralized input purchasing tends 
to be used when the transaction costs for individual transaction are prohibitive 
(Model I). However, to be successful in collective action of centralized output 
marketing, the economies of scale matter as the buyers find it is more efficient to 
organize centralized marketing for FPCs with a wider spatial coverage; the 
coefficient of the dummy for spatial overage of ‘within local village’ is significantly 
negative (Model III). Collective marketing of output is limited at the local village 
level.  
Newly initiated FPCs after the introduction of the legal framework in 2007 are 
active in organizing collective marketing of output and in providing service of input 
purchasing (Model II and III), although the extent of centralization is relatively small 
in the latter.  
Initiating sources affect the governance structure of FPCs in China. As shown in 
Table 6, compared with FPCs initiated by government exclusively, FPCs having 
initiating sources of farmers are inclined to achieve collective action by centralizing 
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the decision making of input purchasing. The dummy variables for initiating sources 
of ‘government + farmers’ and ‘farmers’ are positive and significant (at a 5% level of 
statistical significance). Particularly, when FPCs were initiated by farmers 
exclusively, FPCs tend to centralize both output marketing and production (Model II, 
III, V). Compared to FPCs initiated by the government exclusively, initiating sources 
from agricultural enterprises do not affect the decision-making of both marketing and 
farming.  
As the Chinese government attempts to restructure the traditional low-value 
added agrofood chain in China to a modern one by enhancing the vertical 
coordination between the upstream farmers and the mid- & down-stream segment 
along the agrofood chain, we do observe a significant influence on the decision-
making of marketing in FPCs in China. However, such an externally introduced 
mode of “agro-industrialization” does not affect the decision-making of both input 
use and production. When a FPC becomes a ‘production base’ for agricultural 
enterprises, the FPC function more like an advanced broker to ‘bridge’ the marketing 
exchange between individual farmers and the enterprises (Model IV). When a FPC is 
marketing with a ‘dragon-head’ company that reaches certain scale and quality 
standards, then neither were the production rights affected. The ‘dragon-head’ 
companies seem to organize collective output marketing rather than organizing the 
input and farming (Model III).  Table 6  Determining the decision-rights and income rights of FPCs in China 
  Input Purchase    Output Marketing 
 Centralized  Bridge/ 
Service 
marketing 





 (I)  (II)    (III)  (IV)  (V) 
Product dummy for livestock  18.585***  -0.538    0.495  -0.069  -1.817** 
 [0.875]  [0.735]    [0.923]  [0.716]  [0.925] 
         
Product dummy for aquatic  17.859***  0.095    1.100  -0.520  1.051 
 [1.363]  [0.940]    [1.198]  [0.938]  [1.089] 
         
Product dummy for 
vegetables 
18.920*** -0.674  0.010  -0.245  -1.391 
 [0.918]  [0.758]    [0.914]  [0.737]  [0.928] 
         
17.871 0.051    0.042  0.946  0.681  Product dummy for orchard 
fruits .  [0.849]    [1.127]  [0.865]  [0.964] 
            
FPC has brand  -0.159  0.668    2.143***  -1.524**  -1.367 
 [0.811]  [0.625]    [0.718]  [0.697]  [1.014] 
         
0.954 0.188    -0.481 0.300 1.116  FPC certificate product to  
certain quality standards  [0.732]  [0.586]  [0.741]  [0.606]  [0.890] 
            
1.686** -1.411***    -1.437**  -0.066  0.746  Dummy for spatial coverage: 
Within township  [0.743]  [0.520]    [0.605]  [0.502]  [0.673] 
         
1.275 -1.207**    -0.571  -0.145  -1.708  Dummy for spatial coverage: 
Other villages within 
township 
[0.792] [0.542]    [0.630] [0.537] [1.174] 
            
-0.009 -0.002    -0.002 0.002  0.002  Ratio of formal members to 
total   [0.007]  [0.005]    [0.006] [0.005] [0.008] 
            
Initiating year  -0.147  0.142*    0.387**  0.012  0.247 
 [0.100]  [0.083]    [0.196]  [0.086]  [0.175] 
            
-0.051 1.145**    0.363  0.441  0.787  Dummy for initiating source 
of  
government and farmers 
[0.627] [0.466]    [0.665] [0.459] [0.718] 
         
0.403 1.151**    1.246* -0.654 1.576*  Dummy for initiating source 
of  
farmers 
[0.729] [0.543]    [0.676] [0.543] [0.854] 
         
0.916 -0.060    0.431 0.378 0.976  Dummy for initiating source 
of  
enterprises 
[0.923] [0.664]    [0.776] [0.682] [1.050] 
            
0.791 0.151    -0.423  1.366***  -0.065  FPC contract with 
agribusiness as “production 
base” 
[0.567] [0.449]    [0.576] [0.491] [0.689] 
         
0.630 0.243    0.933*  0.397 0.670  The downstream buyer of 
FPC 
is “dragon-head” company 
[0.546] [0.427]    [0.526] [0.444] [0.613] 
         
Constant 273.875  -284.601*    -778.485**  -24.402  -498.378 
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 [199.848]  [166.175]    [394.388]  [173.000]  [350.858] 
N 157  157    157  157  157 




This study aims to investigate the internal governance of FPCs in transitional China. 
The empirical analysis is based on a national representative survey on 157 farmer 
professional cooperatives in China. We first describe the decision rights and income 
rights of FPCs in China, and then determine the decision-making pattern of FPCs’ on 
two groups of factors including both the economic rationale and the political will. 
The main research findings are summarized as follows. First, the governance of 
FPCs in China is retained on the base of the owner-operator system in which decision 
rights are decentralized to family farmers. However, there is a trend that FPC farmers 
may devolve the decision rights of marketing of input and output to the FPC 
collectives. Second, attributes of agricultural products affect the governance of FPCs 
in a less important sense. High-value added products tend to induce the shift of input 
decisions from farmers to cooperatives. Third, the quality labeling strategy affects the 
allocation of decision rights with FPCs, but it depends on which enforce tool FPCs 
choose. Private names enhance the centralized output marketing, while public 
certification affects none of the governance structure of FPCs. Certification acts more 
like an advertising strategy and has no effects on the governance of the agrofood 
supply chain via FPCs in China.  
Fourth, the FPCs in China are still small and local, being confined to local 
villages. The informational advantage of local governance promotes the collective 
action of input purchasing, and FPC farmers may find it is more efficient to buy 
agro-chemical, feedings, and fertilizers via FPCs, particularly when a great number 
of small manufactures and their dispersed brokers compete in the rural village. 
However, the downstream buyers find the transaction costs are high and it is difficult 
for FPCs to organize collective marketing of output when the spatial coverage is 
within local villages. 
Fifth, the cooperative Law enacted in 2007 has facilitated the development of 
FPCs in China. The newly initiated FPCs after 2007 are active in organizing 
collective marketing. Sixth, the FPCs initiated by farmers easily achieve collective 
action of centralizing the decision making of input purchasing. Furthermore, when 
FPCs are initiated by farmers exclusively, FPCs tend to centralize production and to 
allocate residual claim rights to member farmers. Lastly, the emergence of the new 
agribusiness mode introduces vertical coordination at farm gate via FPCs, but it does 
not affect the farmers’ input use and production. 
WILLIAMSON (1985) demonstrates that the difficulties of coordination of 
economic activities under conditions of uncertainty and risk lead to the adoption of 
indirect democratic decision-making within organizations, introducing hierarchical or 
centralized decision-making procedures. Members’ commitment is most easily 
achieved in small and decentralized cooperatives. To achieve economic efficiency, 
however, many cooperatives become larger and centralize decision making. 
Information that can reduce uncertainty and the associated probability of errors in 
decision making is modeled as input, jointly determining the optimal organizational 
structure (FULTON and KING 1993).  
The emergence of FPCs in China presents mixture of economic rationale, 
political will, and social dimension. The agrofood system in China is affected by the 
transformed agribusiness and relevant policies as well. Smallholder farmers may find 
it difficult to adapt themselves to the transformation. Participating in farmer 
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organizations may help them to get farming inputs and technology. The concentrated 
downstream segment of the agrofood chain also views farmer organizations as a 
viable institutional option to procure products and secure quality. As such, FPCs in 
China have a rich content of ‘subsidiaries’ and the governance structure is 
complicated. Farmers may find the full bundle rights of decision-making are 
undermined, and they have to devolve some rights out, particularly the marketing 
rights. However, as the core part, production rights will not be transferred as the 
family farming has been found the most efficient institutional arrangement in the 
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